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Abstract—Internet security and privacy stand on the trust-
worthiness of public certificates signed by Certificate Authorities
(CAs). However, software products do not trust the same CAs and
therefore maintain different root stores, each typically containing
hundreds of trusted roots capable of issuing “trusted” certificates
for any domain. Incidents with misissued certificates motivated
Google to implement and enforce Certificate Transparency (CT).
CT logs archive certificates in a public, auditable and append-
only manner. The adoption of CT changed the trust landscape,
with logs too maintaining their own root lists and only logging
certificates that chain back to one of their roots. In this paper,
we present a first characterization of this emerging CT root
store landscape, as well as the tool that we developed for data
collection, visualization, and analysis of the root stores. As part
of our characterization, we compare the logs’ root stores and
quantify their changes with respect to both each other and the
root stores of major software vendors, look at evolving vendor CT
policies, and show that root store mismanagement may be linked
to log misbehavior. Finally, we present and discuss the results of
a survey that we have sent to the log operators participating in
Apple’s and Google’s CT log programs.
I. INTRODUCTION
The end-to-end security and privacy provided by HTTPS
heavily depends on the trustworthiness of X.509 certificates
and whether these certificates were signed by a Certificate
Authority (CA) trusted by the client’s software. For example,
most browsers establish a connection using a public key from
a certificate only if (i) it was directly signed by a CA included
in their root store, or (ii) if it was signed by a sequence of
intermediate CAs that chains back to one of these trusted roots.
However, not all CAs are equally trustworthy and software
vendors of browsers have decided to use different root stores.
Furthermore, successful attacks, misconfigurations and other
incidents have significantly reduced the trust in CAs [22].
Certificate Transparency (CT) [21] was recently introduced
as a response to waning CA trust. It provides an additional
measure to improve the general trust in certificates, is al-
ready successfully deployed, and today plays a central and
increasingly important role in the certificate ecosystem. With
CT, certificates are logged in public, auditable, append-only
CT logs. This helps domain owners to discover malicious or
misissued certificates soon after they are issued. Certificates
can be submitted to logs by any party. Upon submission logs
issue Signed Certificate Timestamps (SCTs), which provide a
cryptographic promise that the log will publish the submitted
certificate chain within the log’s Maximum Merge Delay
(MMD). Servers can then deliver SCTs to their clients (e.g.,
browsers) to prove that a certificate has been logged.
Both Google and Apple have implemented their own CT
policies. For example, since 2015, as part of Google Chrome’s
validation process, all newly issued Extended Validation (EV)
certificates are required to be logged in (at least) two Chrome-
trusted CT logs (one Google-operated log and one non-
Google-operated log [14]), and since the release of Chrome
v.68 in Jul. 2018, Chrome requires all certificates issued after
Apr. 2018 to be logged [28]. Similarly, since Oct. 15, 2018,
Apple requires all newly issued certificates to be included in
several logs [6]. Neither Mozilla or Microsoft have a public
CT policy, but some Microsoft products have optional CT
support [25], [32].
To comply with the above policies, CAs (and sometimes
domain owners) are actively submitting their certificates to
logs upon issuance. Over recent years, the CT logs are there-
fore quickly growing in size. For example, between January
2019 and January 2020, the number of entries in the CT logs
tracked by Google increased from ≈3B entries to more than
7.5B entries [16].
By analogy with vendor root stores, there exist many CT
logs and log operators configure their own lists of “trusted” or
“acceptable” [21] root CAs. Since logs only accept certificates
chaining back to these roots, the roots determine which
certificates can be logged (and indirectly also which certifi-
cates can be trusted by Chrome and Apple products). Some
logs also introduce additional submission requirements (e.g.,
expiration constraints). However, in general, it is important
that certificates issued by trusted CAs can be easily submitted
to multiple trusted logs.
In this paper, we present a novel characterization of this
emerging root landscape and the tool that we developed for
data collection, visualization, and analysis of the logs’ root
stores. First, we provide an overview of the active CT logs,
their root stores, describe the changing root store landscape
and relate our observations to current CT policies (by Google
and Apple) and the major vendor root stores (by Apple,
Microsoft, and Mozilla). We observed that root lists are
diverse, that the root stores of most logs are increasing in
size, becoming more similar, but also that most logs’ root
stores do not cover a significant fraction of the root stores
of major software vendors, and that CT relies heavily on the
logs operated by only five log operators (Cloudflare, DigiCert,
Google, Sectigo, and Let’s Encrypt), where the logs of the fifth
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operator only became qualified by Google on Oct. 7, 2019.
This raises questions regarding whether the CT infrastructure
is sufficiently redundant and reliable. Second, we identify and
highlight instances of potential log mismanagement, including
some instances that were followed by log misbehavior events
resulting in logs being distrusted. Third, we highlight a number
of notable roots and specific log behaviors that demonstrate
the diversity in the ways the logs are used. The discussion is
followed by the results of our survey of the five log operators
with Apple- and Google-trusted CT logs. Finally, along with
this paper, we publish our interactive, online, open-source tool
and a longitudinal dataset to allow others to further investigate
the root stores and their relations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes how
Chrome and Apple decide which logs to trust. Section III
presents the tool and dataset. Section IV characterizes logs’
root stores, their relations to each other and to the stores
of major software vendors, as well as how the landscape is
changing. The following section presents our survey results
(Section V-A), highlights log mismanagement and misbehavior
(Section V-B), as well as notable roots and use cases (Sec-
tion V-C). Finally, we present related work (Section VI) and
conclusions (Section VII).
II. TRUSTED VS NON-TRUSTED LOGS
Both Google and Apple maintain their own CT policies and
lists of trusted CT logs, with candidate logs only becoming
trusted after demonstrating policy compliance over a test
period. To become Chrome-trusted (or “qualified”), a log has
to comply with the CT standard [21], properly incorporate
accepted certificate chains within the MMD, and satisfy avail-
ability constraints [14]. Moreover, the root store of every log
must include Google’s MMD Root, which Google’s monitoring
servers use to perform test submissions. Logs are continually
monitored, and Google disqualifies logs that violate policy
requirements. A qualified log must accept all certificates that
chain back to the log’s root store, however, it is allowed to
reject submissions on the basis of validity, revocation, and/or
expiration status. Finally, Chrome-trusted logs have to publish
their root lists and post updates in a corresponding thread of
Google’s CT bugtracker [13]. However, these announcements
intertwine with other log-related posts and do not provide a
solid, tamper-proof and machine-readable history of changes
in the root lists.
Since Apple’s CT policy [6] has no public repository, it
is more difficult to track changes over time. However, we
have observed some updates to the policy, including a new
requirement, stating that “a log must accept certificates that
are issued by Apple’s compliance root CA to monitor the log’s
compliance with these policies” [5]. Apple also states that
“logs must trust all root CA certificates included in Apple’s
trust store” [5]. As we show later in the paper, logs do not fully
adhere to these two requirements. Both log programs adopt a
similar log list schema; participating logs are assigned one
of the following states: usable, qualified, read-only, retired,
pending or rejected.
(a) Euler mode
(b) Listing mode
Fig. 1. Certificate Transparency Root Explorer screenshots: (a) interactively
selected intersection in Euler Diagram visualization mode, and (b) certificate-
listing mode.
III. ROOT EXPLORER AND THE DATASET
To allow readers to dive deeper into our results and the CT
landscape, we will share both our tool and the datasets [19].
Tool: We developed CT Root Explorer — a web-based
open-source interactive tool for data collection and analysis
of logs’ root stores, including the relations to each other and
to major vendor root stores. The tool can be used both on live
data and historic data. The tool first retrieves roots directly
from available logs and/or import/export SQLite snapshots.
The tool allows a user to interactively visualize and analyze se-
lected root stores, explore certificate frequencies, intersections,
complements and unions. Information about roots can also be
filtered and exported. Figure 1 shows the tool’s interface in
Euler diagram mode, in which a user can interactively select
an intersection between a number of logs, and in Certificate
listing mode, in which the information about a selected set
of roots is listed and can be filtered and exported. The
tool also has two other modes, including the Root frequency
mode, which generates an interactive frequency diagram (an
annotated version is presented in Figure 6).
Primary dataset: Since Nov. 2, 2018, we have collected
hourly snapshots of the root stores of all logs listed as known
by Google [17], [15] and Apple [5] using CT Root Explorer
running on Chromium v.71. The default snapshots used in the
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TABLE I
COVERAGE OF VENDOR ROOT STORES AND OTHER PROPERTIES OF AVAILABLE CERTIFICATE TRANSPARENCY LOGS DURING OCTOBER 8TH, 2019 AS
COMPARED TO DECEMBER 27TH, 2018
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Cloudflare Cirrus (RPKI log) 1 not listed not listed 5 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 - +
Cloudflare Nimbus20{17-18} 2 rejected readonly 576 +213 + + 100 +9.8 97.5 +29.7 100 +16.7 - + +
Cloudflare Nimbus20{19-21} 2 usable usable 576 +213 + + 100 +9.8 97.5 +29.7 100 +16.7 - + +
Cloudflare Nimbus20{22-23} 2 qualified usable 576 +213 + + 100 +9.8 97.5 +29.7 100 +16.7 - + +
DigiCert Log Server 3 usable usable 56 +4 1 +1 + 27.5 +1.6 15.7 +3.1 32.9 +2.9 - +
DigiCert Log Server 2 4 usable usable 179 +3 1 + 79.2 -3.0 45.8 +3.7 87.9 -2.8 -
DigiCert Nessie2018 5 rejected rejected 531 +6 2 +1 + 97.2 -2.2 87.1 -4.0 93.3 -2.0 - + +
DigiCert Yeti2018 5 rejected usable 531 +6 2 +1 + 97.2 -2.2 87.1 -4.0 93.3 -2.0 - + +
DigiCert Nessie20{19-22}/Yeti20{19-22} 5 usable usable 531 +6 2 +1 + 97.2 -2.2 87.1 -4.0 93.3 -2.0 - + + +
DigiCert Nessie2023/Yeti2023 5 qualified qualified 531 2 + 97.2 87.1 93.3 - + +
Google Argon2022 6 qualified usable 561 +24 + 99.4 +0.0 97.2 +2.4 100 +0.7 + +
Google Daedalus 6 no state not listed 561 +24 + 99.4 +0.0 97.2 +2.4 100 +0.7 + +
Google Icarus 7 usable usable 3 + 1.1 +0.0 0.6 +0.1 1.3 +0.0 +
Google Skydiver 8 usable usable 559 +24 + 98.3 +0.0 96.6 +2.4 98.7 +0.7 +
Google Solera2023 9 no state not listed 225 + 1.1 0.6 1.3 + +
Google Submariner 10 no state not listed 81 +1 + 20.8 -1.6 20.3 +3.0 15.4 +0.1 +
Google Crucible/Solera20{18-22}/Testtube 9 no state not listed 225 +31 + 1.1 +0.0 0.6 +0.1 1.3 +0.0 +
Google Argon2017 6 rejected usable 561 +24 + 99.4 +0.0 97.2 +2.4 100 +0.7 + +
Google Argon2018/Xenon2018 6 rejected usable 561 +24 + 99.4 +0.0 97.2 +2.4 100 +0.7 + +
Google Argon20{19-21}/Xenon20{19-22} 6 usable usable 561 +24 + 99.4 +0.0 97.2 +2.4 100 +0.7 + +
Google Pilot/Rocketeer 6 usable usable 561 +24 + 99.4 +0.0 97.2 +2.4 100 +0.7 +
Google Argon2023/Xenon2023 6 qualified qualified 561 + 99.4 97.2 100 + +
LetFLs Encrypt Oak20{19-22} 11 qualified qualified 412 + 100 99.4 100 + + +
Nordu Plausible 12 no state not listed 444 + 81.5 -4.7 68.3 -6.6 76.5 -2.8 - +
Sectigo Dodo 13 no state not listed 522 +73 + 100 100 +0.3 100 +0.7 - +
Sectigo Mammoth/Sabre 14 usable usable 371 +14 + 100 89.8 +0.8 98.7 -0.6 - +
WoTrus 15 not listed not listed 9 + 1.7 0.0 0.0 -
CNNIC CT log retired retired
GDCA Log 1/Log 2 rejected rejected 2
GDCA CT log #1/SHECA CT log 2 rejected not listed
Google Aviator readonly readonly
Venafi Gen2 CT log readonly readonly 6
Apple Trust Store version 2018071800 174 94.9 46.2 81.2
Apple Trust Store version 2018121000 178 100 47.4 85.2
Microsoft Trusted Root Program (2018-10) 382 91.6 96.6 97.3
Microsoft Trusted Root Program (2019-07) 325 86.5 100 97.3
Mozilla Included CA Certificate List (2018-12) 150 74.2 44.6 96.6
Mozilla Included CA Certificate List (2019-10) 149 71.3 44.6 100
analysis presented here (and made available with the tool) were
collected on Dec. 27, 2018, and Oct. 8, 2019. These snapshots
include the root stores of 54 and 57 logs, respectively. We also
include corresponding snapshots of the three popular vendor
root stores by Apple [3], [4], Microsoft [24] and Mozilla [26].
(Unlike Firefox, Google Chrome relies on the root store of
the underlying operating system, but reserves the right to
distrust selected CAs [12].) Table I lists the collected logs
and root stores. Here, some logs with identical properties are
grouped by a year range (e.g., Argon20{18-20}), where the
year typically reflects an additional expiration criteria on the
certificates to be logged. We also include Cloudflare Cirrus
and WoTrus (”not listed”), which are not listed as known by
Apple or Google. For each log, we specify their current status
in Google’s and Apple’s log programs. Here, we distinguish
between trusted logs (green) that are (i) usable, and (ii)
qualified (i.e., accepted, but not yet used). Non-trusted logs
include logs that are (i) rejected, (ii) not listed, or have (iii)
no state. At the boundary of this class (yellow) we include
(iv) retired (previously usable/qualified) and (v) read-only
(archived).
Collection and basic log properties: During a live scan, the
tool attempts to retrieve the logs’ acceptable/trusted roots using
the get-roots method of each available log. However, since
only Google’s and Let’s Encrypt’s logs include Cross-origin
Resource Sharing (CORS) related headers in their responses
(see “CORS header” in Table I), we had to disable the CORS
enforcement in our browser (used to protect modern browsers)
to retrieve data from the other logs. Furthermore, due to
some logs having invalid server certificates we disabled TLS
certificate verification. These aspects also complicate creation
of secure client-side browser tools, extensions and web-pages
for the utilization of CT.
To compare root stores, the tool removes duplicates from
JSON root lists returned by get-roots, leaving only distinct
certificates (see “Distinct certificates” and ”Duplicated certifi-
cates” in Table I). To identify equivalent root stores, we con-
catenate unique root hashes in ascending order and compare
the obtained fingerprints (see “Distinct list”). Over time we
have seen an increase in the number of logs (54→57), but a
decrease in the number of distinct lists (18→15).
To determine status and expiry constraints, for each log, we
performed several test submissions of trusted (expired/non-
expired) certificate chains. We then determined whether the
submissions were successful (“+”) or unsuccessful (“−”) due
to an expiration rejection criteria or some other reason. As
expected, logs with a year in their name reject certificates
that do not expire within a specified period. For the other
logs, our test submissions were successful with the exception
for two logs (Aviator and Venafi Gen2 CT) in Dec. 2018
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and eight logs in Oct. 2019 (Nimbus20{17-18}, Argon2017,
Nessie/Yeti2018, Aviator, Venafi Gen 2 CT, WoTrus; five logs
by CNNIC, GDCA, and SHECA are now offline or have an
expired certificate). Some logs reject expired certificates (see
”Reject expired” in Table I); logs with expiration constraints
may be listed as ”usable” (e.g. Argon2018), but by rejecting
expired certificates they essentially become frozen. In some
cases, DigiCert Log Server 2 rejects submissions due to rate
limitations.
IV. HIGH-LEVEL COMPARISONS
We next characterize high-level relationships between root
stores. For detailed, interactive exploration of these relation-
ships, we encourage the use of our tool.
Vendor coverage: Figure 2 (top part) shows the fraction
of roots trusted by Mozilla, Microsoft and Apple that are
not covered by the logs (using logarithmic scale). A closer
look reveals interesting observations. First, the root stores
are significantly different both between and within individual
operators. As expected, for individual operators, the vendor
coverage is typically (but not always) highest for trusted logs
and smallest for testlogs and other non-trusted logs (e.g.,
Cirrus). Second, motivated by the CT standard suggesting
that a list of acceptable root certificates “might usefully
be the union of root certificates trusted by major browser
vendors” [21], many logs have increased their coverage to
100% for at least one or two vendors. (Changes are shown in
Table I and support for our ”motivated by” claims are based
on our operator survey in Section V-A.) Third, despite this
increase, every log except Dodo (72 added roots), is missing
some fraction of roots trusted by Mozilla, Apple or Microsoft.
Fourth, on average, the root stores of Mozilla and Apple are
better covered than Microsoft’s. Fifth, DigiCert, has the lowest
vendor coverage of the five trusted log operators, and do not
appear to have adjusted its root stores to match the changes
made by the vendors.
Trusted vs. non-trusted logs: Although Apple’s list of
trusted logs differs from that of Google (see respective “Log
Program” in Table I), the differences are small and mostly
related to logs with expiration dates in 2017-2018. We also
illustrate this in Figures 2 and 4, where we differentiate
between ”trusted” logs (black text), ”non-trusted” logs (red
text) and the production logs (e.g., Nimbus 20{17-23}) that are
trusted for years 20{19-23} but no longer for prior year (e.g.,
20{17-18}). Most importantly, both Apple and Google rely
exclusively on logs by five operators: Cloudflare, DigiCert,
Google, Sectigo, and Let’s Encrypt (where the last operator’s
logs became Google ”qualified” on Oct. 7, 2019). Logs from
other operators are non-trusted (i.e., rejected, retired, not listed,
or read only). Furthermore, no Apple-trusted log by Google
or DigiCert satisfies Apple’s requirement to “trust all root
CA certificates included in Apple’s trust store” [6], and both
Cloudflare and Let’s Encrypt only do so because of recent
updates to their root lists. These observations suggest that
some requirements of the evolving policies are not strictly
followed. Among non-trusted logs, we note many test logs
(e.g., Testtube, Solera). Their root lists are smaller, mainly
contain test certificates, and miss almost all roots included by
major vendors.
Root store size evolution: Figure 3 shows how the root
store sizes of the five major log operators have changed over
time; for the most part making the root stores larger and
more similar in size. We also include the timeline of a testlog
(Testube, which shares root store with Cruscible and Solera
20{18-22}). Cloudflare (May 2019) and Let’s Encrypt (June
2019) both made major increases to their root stores, making
them more similar in size to those of Google and DigiCert.
At this time, they also increased their coverage of the root
stores of the major vendors. (From the survey, we learned that
Cloudflare update in May 2019 was triggered by email from a
CA.) Interestingly, despite Sectigo Mammoth/Sabre having the
highest vendor coverage (Figure 2), they have the smallest root
store. Finally, we note that during our measurement campaign
the production logs had much fewer root store change events
(three on average) than the testlog (41 events).
Root store (dis)similarity: Figure 4 shows the pairwise root
store overlap between logs, where the overlap is calculated as
|X ∩ Y | / |X| for each pair of logs X and Y . We note that
many pairs overlap substantially and differ only by a few roots
(light yellow). The largest differences are between the test
logs and production logs (e.g., darker regions associated with
Google Solera, Crucible and Testtube). Previously, two GDCA
logs (no longer accessible) and ten DigiCert logs were ”iden-
tical” after removing duplicates. Finally, Figure 5 highlights
some differences observed between the vendor stores and
the major Chrome/Apple-trusted logs, and how the overlaps
between some of these root stores have changed. In almost all
cases, the individual root stores contain unique roots. Among
the vendors, Microsoft has the largest and most dis-similar root
store. Among the logs, the root store of Cloudflare Nimbus
became much more similar to the root stores of Google Argon
and DigiCert Yeti/Nessie, who already shared most of their
roots. Let’s Encrypt Oak and Sectigo Mammoth/Sabre have
fewer roots and smaller overlap with Argon. As a reference
point, we remind the reader that Mammoth/Sabre has close to
full coverage of the three vendor stores.
Root frequencies: Trustworthiness of CAs is relative. It is
therefore not surprising that some roots are more frequently
included than others. Figure 6 shows the frequency distribution
of the observed roots seen at the time of our two main
snapshots. Here, we first grouped distinct certificates by the
number of Chrome-trusted logs that use them as roots, and
then plotted the number of certificates in each group. The most
frequent root certificate (previously included in the root lists of
27 Chrome-trusted logs and currently by 37 such logs) is the
Merge Delay Monitor Root. Logs are required to include this
root to become Chrome-trusted, but the root is also present
in most non-trusted logs. Apple’s corresponding root is not as
frequent. Otherwise, the certificates fall into two categories.
Most of the vendor roots are covered by the majority of the
Chrome-trusted logs. With the exception of two roots (covered
by 11 and 12 logs in the last snapshot), the rest of the roots
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Fig. 2. Top: Fractions of vendor root stores that are not covered by the logs. Bottom: Log root stores and intersections with vendor root stores. Text color
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covered by less than 17 logs (some of which are not present
in vendor stores) are included in the root lists by the logs of
just one or two operators. This is not sufficiently redundant.
Venafi Gen2 CT, responsible for the majority of the least
frequent certificates in the Dec. 2018 dataset, is now frozen.
However, most of these certificates are not self-signed roots,
but intermediaries that can be chained back to already included
roots.
High skew in root usage: There is a high skew in the
usage of different roots and many of the roots included by the
major logs are not used. Figure 7(a) shows an upper bound on
the number of roots that was used by the Nimbus20{19,20}
and Argon20{19,20} logs each day during the measurement
period and Figures 7(b) shows an upper bound on the number
of days that each root may have been used. These bounds were
obtained using Censys [8] by extracting information about all
certificates logged to these logs and checking which set of
roots that these certificates chain back too (can be more than
one). Comparing these numbers with the root store sizes of
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Fig. 4. Pairwise root store overlap between CT logs.
|LogX ∩ LogY | / |LogX|. Text color label: ”Trusted” (black), ”non-
trusted” (red), depends on expiry date (grey).
these logs (which changes from 363 to 576 and from 537 to
561, respectively, during the measurement period), we note
that more than half of the roots are not used at all, and less
than 113 (Argon2020) of the roots are used more than 10%
of the days.
V. LOG MANAGEMENT
A. Operator survey
We emailed questions (Sept. 23, 2019) about log man-
agement to the five Google/Apple trusted log operators, and
got answers from all five: Google, Let’s Encrypt, Cloudflare,
Sectigo, and DigiCert. The questions are listed in appendix.
With exception of DigiCert, the operators create their root
lists automatically, in some cases involving a manual review
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Fig. 6. Certificates grouped by how many Chrome-trusted logs include them.
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Fig. 7. Upper bounds of individual root usage.
step before lists are promoted to the production logs. Both
Google and Sectigo explicitly state that they use the union
of the trusted roots from the Mozilla, Microsoft, and Apple
trusted root programs. The main difference is that Google
typically do not remove roots from the set of accepted roots
(although they state that there is on-going discussion about
potentially starting to do this), whereas Sectigo base their lists
on their current crt.sh data [34]. Cloudflare have their own
roots program, in which they explicitly lists root stores they
cover, but they also update based on requests from CAs. Lets
Encrypt also mentioned that they obtained a root from Apple
(per email) to perform similar tests as Googles MMD root
and that they plan to create similar tools as those used by
Cloudflare (e.g., [7]).
DigiCert maintains a master file of acceptable roots that gets
pushed out with every deploy. The original list for their high
performance logs was created from the browser trust stores,
to which they add roots included in at least one browser root
store as email requests to include these come in. At some point,
they plan to find and add all the roots that are acceptable by
the new Google logs.
Cloudflare and Sectigo stated that (as far as they know)
they have not intentionally enabled or disabled CORS, with
Cloudflare noting that they currently do not set them since
they have not yet had reason to update their code (which is
based on the Trillian code base) to the latest version of Trillian
(which allows CORS headers), and note that such updates
would involve significant changes and testing of closed-source
code for their internal infrastructure.
All operators seem to agree that the process of root manage-
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ment is secure enough. The main comments that came up were
related to more transparent root management of the logs. For
example, Lets Encrypt mentioned the value of public monitors
such as the one developed (and made available) in this paper
and how they believe that the CT landscape could benefit from
root program operators providing an easily ingestible list of
root CAs trusted on various platforms. DigiCert suggested that
it would be nice if log operators had a statement explaining
their criteria for including new roots. Google brought up the
idea (for future versions of CT) to potentially ”require logs
to commit changes to their set of trusted roots as a new
leaf type which they log to themselves.” This would make
it harder to play games with root sets, and would provide a
new mechanism for others to become aware of updated root
sets.
B. Incidents and potential mismanagement
We have observed a number of events and behaviors that
warrant comments.
Duplicated roots: Several logs respond to the get-roots
method with root lists that include duplicates (”Duplicates”
in Table I and Table II in appendix). These duplicates
may have been introduced by accident due to manual log
(mis)configuration, or a bug in a log server implementation.
However, we have found that the misbehavior of GDCA
and Sectigo logs (described next) coincided with anomalous
presentation of their root stores, when duplicate roots were
introduced. Moreover, the frozen Venafi Gen2 CT log also con-
tains duplicates. We conclude that the presence of duplicated
roots could be used as an indicator of log’s potential (root)
mismanagement. At this moment, DigiCert Log Server 2, Yeti
and Nessie logs still contain duplicates. DigiCert acknowledge
this as an oversight likely caused by a CA having asked for
inclusion of a root that already was in the list of acceptable
roots, but do not consider this a serious issue. We believe that
a mechanism for transparent management of root lists would
be beneficial. Such a mechanism would improve monitoring
and could prevent trust-related log misbehavior. Versioning of
root stores in public repositories similar to [31] could be a
possible solution.
GDCA logs: On Aug. 16, 2018, GDCA Log 1 failed to
incorporate two SCTs within the MMD. The SCTs were issued
during an update of the root lists for Log 1 and Log 2 [23].
According to GDCA, the accident was caused by a reboot after
the update. Google disqualified Log 1 and GDCA withdrew
their request to include Log 2 in Chrome. Interestingly, we
found that duplicates were introduced at the time of the
incident and that they remained there until the logs were shut
down (on Jan. 15 and Feb. 14, 2019).
Sectigo Mammoth, Sabre and Dodo: We have observed
outages for Sabre and Mammoth, with up-time of Sabre
going below 99%. We have also noticed that Mammoth was
sporadically returning two different root lists, as Fina Root CA
and Hongkong Post Root CA 3 have been randomly appearing
in Mammoth’s root list between Dec. 6, 2018 and Jan. 2, 2019.
While Sectigo answered our survey, they have yet to comment
on these events.
C. Notable roots and use cases
Test roots in trusted logs: In general, you would not expect
test roots in Chrome or Apple-trusted logs. However, we have
found that DigiCert Log Server 2, Yeti and Nessie logs include
two DigiCert CT Test Roots in their root lists that are not
directly logged in any of the trusted logs. (While most attempts
were rejected due to rate limits setup for the older DigiCert
logs, to protect the log from risk of failure or missing the
MMD for new entries, we could not resist the temptation,
and have now logged one of these certificates [1].) DigiCert
have since explained that they included some test roots for
monitoring purpose. Let’s Encrypt logs also include a test root
ct-woodpecker.
DigiNotar Root CA in Cloudflare logs: DigiNotar is a
former CA that went bankrupt due to a well-known attack [29]
on its infrastructure. This attack and the fact that misissued
certificates could remain undetected was one of the reasons
for the creation of CT [2]. Surprisingly, Cloudflare Nimbus
logs include DigiNotar Root CA certificate in their lists of
acceptable roots, years after the attack. Assuming that there
still exists a party with access to its private key, this party could
issue an arbitrary number of DigiNotar-signed certificates
acceptable by Nimbus logs1. When asked, Cloudflare did not
know why this root was in their root store, but have no plans to
remove it either. (A closer look at the Cloudflare root policy [7]
suggests that the inclusion may be due to them using the
union of several OS trust stores, including some that include
DigiNotar (e.g., Android Gingerbread and Honeycomb). While
we have seen roots being removed, some operators appear to
rather be inclusive than hinder some CAs from submitting.
The above example presents an interesting dilemma. Nowa-
days, Cloudflare Nimbus is the only log that allows DigiNo-
tar certificates. It potentially could help understand or even
identify the attacker if a rogue certificate is logged. However,
in the case when other operators add this certificate to their
lists of acceptable roots (e.g., to increase the chance that
such certificates are logged), an attacker would be able to
obtain enough SCTs to satisfy requirements of CT policies,
and hence may more easily trick a client on which the
DigiNotar Root CA certificate is somehow valid. To avoid
such future conflicts, we suggest that non-trusted roots perhaps
should be stored in separate logs; e.g., similar to the how
Google Daedalus (discussed below) is used to store expired
certificates. Moreover, a common and homogeneous approach
to the formation of root stores in logs would eliminate such
outlying cases.
Cirrus: A closer look at the root stores (and the logs’
content) also highlight other interesting example use cases of
CT. For example, rather than storing certificates associated
with the WebPKI, Cloudflare Cirrus is used with Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [10] and its root store only
1A successful attack on a log may interrupt issuance process of some CAs.
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contains the certificates of the five Regional Internet Registries
(RIRs): AFRINIC, APNIC, ARIN, LACNIC, RIPE.
Daedalus: While the root store of Google Daedalus is
equivalent to the stores of the Argon, Xenon, Pilot and
Rocketeer logs, it is unique in that it only accepts expired
certificates. It is not trusted by Chrome nor Apple. We believe
that Daedalus provides an example of how non-trusted logs
can be used to log non-trusted certificates of potential interest,
which we believe could be extended to cover some of the
roots that the browsers no longer trust (e.g., DigiNotar example
above).
SHECA CT log 2: The skew in usage of the logs is
high [18], with some logs seeing very limited use. As an
extreme example, SHECA CT log 2 was idling with just two
certificates in its tree between Apr. 2017 and Jan. 2019, when
we successfully performed a test submission. The log’s server
certificate could be chained back to Mozilla’s root store, but
not to Apple’s, meaning that by default, Apple clients were
unable to establish a secure connection to the log. The log was
taken offline in Mar. 2019.
VI. RELATED WORK
While a number of studies have characterized the CT
landscape [18], [30], very limited results have been reported
regarding their root selections. For example, Gustafsson et
al. [18] provide basic root count for eleven public logs avail-
able in Dec. 2015 and list basic log properties, but primarily
provide statistics (based on active and passive measurement
data) of the relative CT usage among domains and CAs. Most
other papers focus on logged certificates [11], [20] and on
specific aspects, such as server-side use of SCTs [27], [2] and
client-side performance of SCT delivery methods [27]. Amann
et al. have studied and compared the adoption of several
technologies (including CT) that strengthen the WebPKI [2].
Privacy issues of CT are considered by Eskandarian et al. [9].
A longitudinal study on CAs, log operators, and CT deploy-
ment on servers is presented by Scheitle et al. [30]. In the
study, they also apply CT for the detection of phishing domains
and highlight the use of CT by third-parties for malicious
purposes. Stark et al. [33] study the adoption of CT and
estimate the compliance to Google’s CT policy using client-
side Chrome telemetry. In contrast to prior work, our focus is
on the root stores of the logs and their relationship to the root
stores of major vendors and CT policies.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a first characterization of the
emerging root store landscape and the CT Root Explorer tool
for interactive analysis thereof. We overviewed CT logs and
analyzed their root stores relative to the stores of Apple,
Microsoft and Mozilla. We have monitored and summarized
the properties of 57 CT logs, including all available logs from
Google’s and Apple’s lists of known logs, and observed how
the root stores change over time.
The landscape of CT is evolving: the technology is highly
established and is commonly used by the majority of CAs and
clients on the Internet, which makes it strategically important;
software vendors introduce and change their CT policies, new
logs are established regularly, while the recent introduction of
Cloudflare Cirrus extended the use of CT to ResourcePKI.
Over our measurement campaign root stores have became
larger and increased their coverage of the roots used by the
major vendors.
To directly measure the status of the available CT logs,
we have performed a number of test submissions, and by
calculating frequencies of root certificates in logs, we have
found a number of roots that are included in the root lists by
just one or two log operators. Surprisingly, Cloudflare Nimbus
logs include a compromised DigiNotar root certificate in their
root lists. Multiple logs are considered Apple/Google-trusted
despite violating corresponding policies. We have discovered
that all CT logs (except Google’s and Let’s Encrypt’s) do
not specify cross-origin headers in their HTTP responses,
which obstructs access to the logs using JavaScript in modern
browsers.
Overall, we have observed that some WebPKI roots trusted
by major software vendors are not sufficiently covered by the
CT logs; Apple and Google rely on the CT backbone that is
comprised of just five actively logging operators: Cloudflare,
DigiCert, Google and Sectigo (all of these operators are US-
based). Several logs have already been disqualified, while
Sectigo’s trusted production logs (Mammoth/Sabre) have been
seen to struggle with their up-time requirements. Moreover, we
have found logs with duplicates in their root lists and that an
accident with GDCA Log 1 and outages of Sectigo Mammoth
coincide with anomalous presentation of their root stores. One
other misbehaving log which is currently in read-only state
(Venafi CT Gen2) has also been presenting root stores with
duplicated entries in it. Finally, we argue that management of
CT policies and logs’ root stores must be performed in a more
careful, timely and transparent manner.
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APPENDIX
Our survey contained seven questions (plus some log-
specific questions based on our findings about the operators
logs). These questions are listed next:
• Do you setup the lists of acceptable roots for your logs
manually or automatically?
• How is the set of acceptable roots formed/updated? (I.e.,
what is your policy for managing the list of acceptable
root certificates?)
• How often do you update your list(s) of acceptable roots?
• Are there any procedures for root store verification and
provision in place?
• (If applicable) Some logs do not explicitly ship cross-
origin (CORS) headers with their responses, which pre-
vents browsers from querying the logs using javascript.
Is this intentional? And if so, what is the reason?
• In general, do you consider the process of root manage-
ment transparent and secure enough?
• (If applicable) What kind of improvements would you
suggest to increase the security and transparency of the
logs and to avoid future misconfigurations?
Tables II and III list the specific roots that were duplicated
in the JSON root lists of some of the logs, and the logs that
contained these duplicates, as observed on Dec. 27, 2018, and
Oct. 8, 2019, respectively.
TABLE II
LOGS WITH DUPLICATES IN ROOT LISTS (DECEMBER 27, 2018)
Logs Duplicated Root
DigiCert Log Server 2
DigiCert Yeti20*
DigiCert Nessie20*
Atos TrustedRoot 2011
GDCA Log 1
GDCA Log 2
DigiCert Trusted Root G4
Merge Delay Monitor Root
Venafi Gen2 CT log
Buypass Class 2 Root CA
Buypass Class 3 Root CA
TWCA Root Certification Authority
Certum Trusted Network CA
T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 3
Entrust Certification Authority - L1E
TABLE III
LOGS WITH DUPLICATES IN ROOT LISTS (OCTOBER 8, 2019)
Logs Duplicated Root
DigiCert Log Server Atos TrustedRoot 2011 (1)
DigiCert Log Server 2 Atos TrustedRoot 2011 (2)
DigiCert Yeti20*
DigiCert Nessie20*
Atos TrustedRoot 2011 (2)
VRK Gov. Root CA
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